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If avian flu becomes directly transmissible among humans, could we
prevent a pandemic by using prophylactic antivirals? Possibly, if the
virus is not too transmissible, and we react fast and efficiently.Robert M. May
Since 1997, a highly pathogenic
avian influenza virus (AIV), of the
subtype H5N1, has emerged in
poultry in Southeast Asia.
Concern is rising, for several
reasons. In May 2005, the virus
was found in migratory waterfowl
in western China [1] and most
recently AIV is reported among
birds in Turkey and Romania. To
date, essentially all the few, but
increasing, human cases appear
to have come from human-to-bird
contact, causing around 60
deaths from something like 120
known infections [2]. Past flu
pandemics are believed to have
arisen when AIV has reassorted
with a human influenza virus,
within a dually infected human
patient, resulting in a new variant
capable of direct transmission
from human to human.
So, what is our chance of
containing such a H5N1 or similar
flu epidemic, if and when it
appears? This question is
addressed in two separate and
recent numerical studies [3,4].
Both assume that AIV jumps tohumans in Southeast Asia, and
use evidence from experience
with previous flu epidemics to
assess the parameters in complex
and detailed models of the spread
of infection originating in Thailand,
and the possibilities of averting a
pandemic.
Central to any such study is the
infection’s basic reproductive
number, R0, which quantifies its
transmissibility; R0 is defined as
the average number of secondary
cases generated by a typical
primary case in an entirely
susceptible population [5].
Epidemics can arise if R0 exceeds
one, and not otherwise. Control
strategies aim to reduce R0 below
one, by effectively removing a
proportion 1 – (1/R0) of the
susceptible population.
Longini et al. [3] estimate R0 as
around 1.4 — based on about
33% of the population being
infected in past Asian pandemics
— but their simulations explore
R0-values from 1.1 to 2.4.
Ferguson et al. [4] estimate R0 at
1.8 — based on re-analysis of
earlier data, suggesting the
average ‘generation interval’between an individual becoming
infected and infecting a contact
is around 2.6 days, rather than
the previously estimated 4 — but
they also explore a range
1 < R0 < 2. Longini et al. [3]
assume a model population of
500,000 people, with age-
structure and patterns of
movement within and between 36
geographical regions,
characteristic of rural Thailand
(as revealed in its 2000 census).
Ferguson et al. [4], using massive
parallel computational capacity,
work with spatially detailed
simulations of the 85 million
people in Thailand and in a
100 kilometre-wide zone outside
its borders, explicitly including
households, schools and
workplaces.
Figure 1 illustrates how an
outbreak of flu might spread in
Thailand, if there is no
intervention, roughly 90 days after
the first case. It comes from
Ferguson et al.’s [4] simulations,
seeded with a single rural
individual. For the first 30 days,
the epidemic tends to be spatially
confined. As ‘sparks’ are
increasingly shed into other
regions, numbers increase
exponentially and infectious
individuals spread over larger
distances [6]. Between 60 and 90
days the epidemic changes from
being mainly local to being
country-wide. Any control
strategy needs to be
Dispatch    
R923implemented effectively before
this time; after this, logistic
constraints make success
unlikely. If R0 is 1.8, the
unchecked epidemic infects
roughly two-thirds of the
modelled population of 85 million.
Methods available for stopping
a flu epidemic come under three
headings. First, ‘targeted antiviral
prophylaxis’ (TAP). Antiviral
drugs, of which the most effective
currently is oseltamivir (Trade
Name ‘Tamiflu’, which inhibits the
action of neuraminidase, the N of
H5N1), work by significantly
reducing transmission. Although
they can also help an individual to
fight off infection, for population-
level prophylaxis they need to be
administered in advance of
apparent infection. Ferguson et
al. [4] estimate that blanketing an
entire country or region with
Tamiflu should be able to
eliminate a pandemic virus with
an R0 of even 3.6 or greater. But
such action is logistically difficult,
if not impossible. Targeted
strategies are therefore needed. 
Both Ferguson et al. [4] and
Longini et al. [3] look at forms of
social targeting as the most
straightforward approach. This
involves prophylaxing individuals
in the same household, school or
workplace as newly diagnosed
symptomatic cases. And doing so
very promptly. Indeed, given that
‘social targeting’ may be too slow
to be effective, both sets of
authors assume somewhat wider
targeting to local neighbourhoods.
Longini et al. [3] call this
Geographical targeted antiviral
prophylaxis (GTAP). Second,
vaccination would be excellent if
we had a vaccine. Although a
human influenza H5N1 vaccine is
currently being tested, and may
be available in time, the problem
is — as is the case for normal
seasonal flu vaccines — we
cannot be certain how effective
the vaccine under development
may be against the strain that
eventually appears. Third, we
have quarantine, or other ways of
effectively reducing contact rates
within the population (Ferguson
et al. [4] call this “social distance
measures”).
Exploring various
combinations of these actions,Longini et al. [3] concluded that a
prepared response with GTAP
would have a high probability of
containing the epidemic,
provided R0 was below 1.6. Such
containment is achieved, in their
simulations, with an antiviral
stock pile of around 100,000 to 1
million courses of treatment. If
effective pre-vaccination
occurred — assuming only 30%
efficiency, and only halving
transmissibility — then TAP
could be effective against strains
with R0 as high as 2.1. And if one
could use combinations of TAP,
pre-vaccination and quarantine,
then success could be achieved
even against strains with R0 as
high as 2.4.
Ferguson et al.’s [4] studies of
control were focussed mainly on
targeted antiviral prophylaxis.
This was partly because they saw
logistic difficulties in “social
distance measures”, and partly
because they believed some such
actions could have unintended
adverse consequences as a result
of people dispersing. Broadly,
their more computationally
ambitious model — remember,
they included the actual 85 million
people in and around Thailand,
versus Longini et al.’s [3] 500,000,
rather tidily distributed —
concluded that a combination of
GTAP and social distance
measures could contain an
outbreak in Thailand and avoid a
pandemic, provided the new
virus’ R0 is below 1.8. But their
corresponding calculations
required a stockpile of 3 million
courses of antiviral drugs. And for
larger values of R0, even this
would seem insufficient.
In the light of these
conclusions, a glance backward
to 1918 is in order. The number
killed in that pandemic is
estimated at 20 to 50 million. But
the global population then was
less than 2 billion, with only one
quarter urban. And the relatively
smaller number of people
crossing oceans did so in ships.
Today’s threatened pandemic
looms over a more crowded world
of 6.5 billion, half urban,
constantly and rapidly moving
around. We know much more, but
our circumstances are inherently
more difficult.In the UK, the government has
announced plans to stockpile
enough courses of Tamiflu to
cover one quarter of the UK
population by the end of 2006. In
a world of good surveillance,
efficient delivery of TAP, and no
panic, this would be adequate
provided H5N1 waits until the UK
is ready. In the real world of
panicking people, the UK plans
could prove more problematic.
Meanwhile, the USA is
committing $25 million to
boosting surveillance in Asia. An
official at the National
Immunization Program of the US
Centers for Disease Control has
juxtaposed this sum against the
$800 million spent by the USA on
anthrax vaccines, “against a
pathogen that has killed only a
handful of Americans and whose
bioterrorist potential is
unproven” [7]. We live in
interesting times.
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There is no place in an animal for
a cell with an identity crisis. A
confused cell is unlikely to
function properly and may be
dangerous if, for example, it starts
to proliferate inappropriately. The
concept that cells need to make
stable, all-or-nothing fate
decisions was developed by
Waddington in the first half of the
last century [1]. He termed this
process ‘canalisation’ and
illustrated the idea with artistic
drawings of what he called an
epigenetic landscape (Figure 1A).
His rather theoretical idea has
proved to be correct and
fundamental. It is becoming
apparent that a variety of
mechanisms exist to ensure that
developmental decisions are
robust [2–4]. Although most
studies have focussed on the
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triggered by apparently fleeting
developmental signals, into long-
term cellular memory, the
increasingly detailed knowledge
of signalling mechanisms has led
to a recognition that these
pathways themselves have
sometimes evolved into robust
networks that generate stable
decisions [5].
An example of apparently
similar cells making distinct fate
decisions are the colour-
detecting photoreceptors of the
retina. To see colours, our brain
computes the outputs of
photoreceptors with different
spectral sensitivities. The fruitfly
Drosophila has a random mosaic
of colour-detecting
photoreceptors in its retina
(Figure 1B) [6] and a recent paper
[7] has described a mechanism
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DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2005.10.063that ensures that these cells
make a robust choice between
alternative colour-detecting fates.
The Drosophila compound eye is
formed from about 800 unit eyes
(ommatidia), each with six
monochromatic outer
photoreceptors surrounding two
stacked colour detecting
photoreceptors, known as R7
and R8. The R7/R8 pair comes in
two randomly distributed forms:
70% are ‘yellow’, with R7
expressing the rhodopsin Rh4
and R8 expressing rhodopsin
Rh6; the remaining 30% are
‘pale’, with R7 expressing Rh3
and R8 expressing Rh5 (‘yellow’
and ‘pale’ refer to their
appearance under a microscope)
[8,9]. Yellow ommatidia detect
longer wavelengths, into the
green part of the spectrum, while
the pale ones detect shorter
wavelengths, in the blue and UV
range.
The decision between a yellow
or pale fate is initiated when the
R7 cell in each ommatidium
makes an apparently stochastic
choice of whether to express Rh3
or Rh4. This decision is then
communicated to the adjacent R8
cell, forcing it to comply with the
‘golden rule’ that R8 must express
Rh5 if partnered with an Rh3-
expressing R7, or Rh6 if partnered
with a Rh4-expressing R7 [9]
(Figure 2A). To investigate further
the mechanism underlying retinal
mosaicism, Mikeladze-Dvali et al.
[7] searched for genes expressed
in mosaic patterns and found one
that was restricted to yellow R8s.
Intriguingly this was the warts
(wts) gene (also known as lats),
encoding a cytoplasmic
serine/threonine kinase already
famous for its role as a tumour
suppressor that regulates cell
growth and death [10]. Their
attention was then drawn to
